{
  "schemaVersion": "1.0",
  "disclaimer": "Self-audit companion file. NOT a third-party formal audit of the listed protocols; these are public incident summaries with ASPE Labs applicability notes.",
  "source": "OPS-014 — External Hack Registry & Lessons Learned (append-only, cadence: monthly or on-hack-external)",
  "sourceDoc": "docs/ops/OPS-014_external-hack-registry.md",
  "reportVersion": "2.0",
  "lastUpdated": "2026-04-21",
  "count": 31,
  "note": "Each entry has: id, date, protocol, chain, attackVector, amountLostUsd, amountRecoveredUsd, timeWindow, rootCause, reference, auditors, attribution, aspeRelevance (our applicability), aspeGap (exposed gap, if any), aspeMitigation (what we do about it). Columns aspeRelevance/aspeGap/aspeMitigation are live — revised as our architecture evolves. Date + amounts + rootCause are historical facts and immutable.",
  "hacks": [
    {
      "id": "HACK-0001",
      "date": "2023-03-13",
      "protocol": "Euler Finance",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Donation attack + self-liquidation",
      "amountLostUsd": "197000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "197000000",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "donate() sin health check + dynamic liquidation penalty permite auto-liquidarse con 20% discount",
      "reference": "Cyfrin deep-dive",
      "auditors": "Halborn, Solidified, ZK Labs, Certora (6 audits)",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "High",
      "aspeGap": "Verificar totalAssets() no usa balanceOf(address(this)) naked → IMPL-012 T3.2 covered (virtual shares OZ 5.2.0 + accounting interno)",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-012 S3a SA1-SA9 PASS; OZ decimalsOffset=6"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0025",
      "date": "2020+",
      "protocol": "ERC4626 inflation attack (pattern)",
      "chain": "Any",
      "attackVector": "Donation pre-first-deposit manipula ratio 1-wei/share",
      "amountLostUsd": "null",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "null",
      "timeWindow": "unknown",
      "rootCause": "Primer depositante + donation gigante → subsequent deposits round to 0 shares",
      "reference": "OZ novel defense",
      "auditors": "Pattern-level",
      "attribution": "unknown",
      "aspeRelevance": "Critical",
      "aspeGap": "Primer deposit adversarial S1 test → IMPL-012 T2.1 S1 PASS",
      "aspeMitigation": "OZ 5.2.0 virtual shares offset=6; seed deposit operador pre-abierto al público (IMPL-028)"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0007",
      "date": "2024-09-03",
      "protocol": "Penpie (Pendle)",
      "chain": "Ethereum/Arbitrum",
      "attackVector": "Reentrancy via permissionless pool registration + callback en batchHarvestMarketRewards",
      "amountLostUsd": "27000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "Callback externo sin reentrancy guard en multi-step state machine",
      "reference": "Penpie post-mortem",
      "auditors": "AstraSec (scope parcial)",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "High",
      "aspeGap": "Async redemption requestRedeem → Claimable → Claimed tiene multi-step; cada step necesita CEI + nonReentrant",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-012 T2.1 S3+S7 PASS (nonReentrant + SafeERC20, no callback vector con USDC)"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0006",
      "date": "2025-11-03",
      "protocol": "Balancer V2 Composable Stable Pools",
      "chain": "Multi-chain",
      "attackVector": "Rounding asymmetry en _upscaleArray",
      "amountLostUsd": "128000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "Upscale round-down vs downscale round-up → precision loss ~10% cuando balance en rango 8-9 wei",
      "reference": "ToB analysis, Certora",
      "auditors": "ToB, Certora (multiple historical)",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "High",
      "aspeGap": "Fee model Yearn V3 + convertToShares/convertToAssets: verificar rounding direction consistente (user round-down, vault round-up per ERC4626 spec)",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-012 T3.2 SA1-SA9 + S1 boundary tests; re-verificar en SEC-004 S4 con matriz direccional explícita"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0026",
      "date": "2025-09",
      "protocol": "Bunni (Uniswap v4 hook)",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Withdrawal rounding error → protocol shutdown",
      "amountLostUsd": "8400000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~6h",
      "rootCause": "Rounding en withdraw permite extracción incremental",
      "reference": "Various 2025 postmortems",
      "auditors": "Si (pre-hack)",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "High",
      "aspeGap": "Withdrawal via claim pro-rata + full emergency claim; boundary tests (0, 1, max-1) obligatorios",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-012 S2 fuzz testFuzz_emergency_proRata 1000+ runs; ampliar con convertToAssets(convertToShares(x)) <= x invariante en SEC-004"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0003",
      "date": "2023-07-30",
      "protocol": "Curve (Vyper pools)",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Reentrancy via Vyper compiler bug en @nonreentrant lock",
      "amountLostUsd": "70000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "52000000",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "Vyper 0.2.15-0.3.0 mal-compilaba locks → reentrancy en add/remove_liquidity",
      "reference": "Vyper post-mortem, LlamaRisk",
      "auditors": "Si (pre-awareness)",
      "attribution": "whitehat",
      "aspeRelevance": "Medium",
      "aspeGap": "Compiler/toolchain trust es threat. Solidity 0.8.28 puede tener bugs latentes.",
      "aspeMitigation": "Pin solc=0.8.28 en foundry.toml; SEC-004 §8 Threat Model incluye toolchain; residual risk doc + revisión Solidity release notes cada upgrade"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0004",
      "date": "2022-10-11",
      "protocol": "Mango Markets",
      "chain": "Solana",
      "attackVector": "Oracle manipulation (low-liquidity spot pump 2394%)",
      "amountLostUsd": "117000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "67000000",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "MNGO price manipulado en DEX thin-liquidity → collateral artificial",
      "reference": "Chainalysis",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "Medium",
      "aspeGap": "Vault V1 no tiene oracle; bridge accounting via realized P&L epoch-based. Phase 2 con oracles: multi-source + deviation circuit breakers.",
      "aspeMitigation": "Diseño actual evita oracle dependency; RISK-001 documenta; SEC-004 §8 actor × asset confirma"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0005",
      "date": "2023-11-23",
      "protocol": "KyberSwap Elastic",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Tick boundary rounding (swap amount = amountToCrossTick - 1)",
      "amountLostUsd": "47000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "Boundary off-by-one en sqrtP → liquidity base doubled",
      "reference": "KyberSwap post-mortem",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "Medium",
      "aspeGap": "Boundary arithmetic bugs son categoría entera. Tests explícitos (0, 1, max, max-1) en convertToShares/convertToAssets",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-012 S1-S18 tests; ampliar SEC-004 S4 con boundary-specific matrix"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0002",
      "date": "2021-08-30",
      "protocol": "Cream Finance",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Reentrancy via ERC-777 AMP token tokensReceived() hook",
      "amountLostUsd": "25000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "Callback token no-standard en borrow() sin guard",
      "reference": "Cream post-mortem",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "Low",
      "aspeGap": "USDC (ERC-20 standard) único asset Phase 0. Phase 2 multi-asset: whitelist explícita + reentrancy audit por token custom",
      "aspeMitigation": "none (single-asset USDC)"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0008",
      "date": "2020-10-26",
      "protocol": "Harvest Finance",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Flash-loan oracle manipulation (Curve Y pool)",
      "amountLostUsd": "33800000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "2500000",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "Vault usaba Curve pool price como oracle",
      "reference": "Harvest post-mortem",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "Low",
      "aspeGap": "Validación de design: vault usa accounting interno (principal + realized profit), NO mark-to-market spot",
      "aspeMitigation": "none"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0011",
      "date": "2024-10-16",
      "protocol": "Radiant Capital",
      "chain": "Arbitrum",
      "attackVector": "DPRK social eng + INLETDRIFT macOS malware + blind signing en Ledger",
      "amountLostUsd": "50000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "3-of-11 multisig, Gnosis Safe frontend modificado post-compromise, Ledger no parsea calldata Safe",
      "reference": "Radiant post-mortem",
      "auditors": "OZ, BlockSec, Peckshield",
      "attribution": "DPRK-Lazarus",
      "aspeRelevance": "**Critical**",
      "aspeGap": "GUARDIAN = hot EOA (P0 residual risk per SEC-004 §13; migration a HW wallet diferida hasta pre-prod gate, ver IMPL-040 stage 0a); blind signing en cualquier hardware wallet usado para admin ops",
      "aspeMitigation": "SEC-004 §13 Residual Risk P0 (hardware wallet + device-que-parsea-calldata mandatory pre-producción); SEC-003 §3 cubre threat"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0029",
      "date": "2024",
      "protocol": "Drift Protocol",
      "chain": "Solana",
      "attackVector": "DPRK 6-month social eng + Cursor/VSCode trojanized + durable nonces pre-firmadas",
      "amountLostUsd": "285000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "null",
      "timeWindow": "unknown",
      "rootCause": "Long-con pretexting (entrevistas falsas, offers) + malicious IDE extension exploit autoRun",
      "reference": "The Block",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "DPRK-Lazarus",
      "aspeRelevance": "**Critical**",
      "aspeGap": "Sole-operator reduce superficie pero no elimina DPRK. Zero-trust para contratistas + verificación out-of-band",
      "aspeMitigation": "RESEARCH-033 approved; SEC-003 §2 OpSec threats; OPS-010 §15 IDE hygiene"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0030",
      "date": "2026-03-22",
      "protocol": "Resolv Labs",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Contractor CI/CD compromise → GitHub PAT con deploy pipeline access",
      "amountLostUsd": "25000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "unknown",
      "rootCause": "PAT classic con scope amplio → modifica pipeline → firma tx via KMS impersonation",
      "reference": "Various 2026 postmortems referenced en RESEARCH-033",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "**Critical**",
      "aspeGap": "CI/CD hardening: GitHub PAT classic, branch protection, CODEOWNERS",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-040 S3 planeado (branch protection + fine-grained PATs + signed commits); residual risk hasta S3 done"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0010",
      "date": "2022-03-23",
      "protocol": "Ronin Bridge",
      "chain": "Ethereum/Ronin",
      "attackVector": "Validator key compromise via spear-phishing (DPRK)",
      "amountLostUsd": "540000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "162000000",
      "timeWindow": "~6d",
      "rootCause": "5-of-9 validators: 4 Sky Mavis + 1 Axie DAO dio rights permanentes; spear-phishing comprometió Sky Mavis",
      "reference": "Ronin post-mortem, Elliptic",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "DPRK-Lazarus",
      "aspeRelevance": "High",
      "aspeGap": "3-tier timelock reduce blast radius pero Protective Tier es instant. Vault owner = 1 EOA Phase 0.",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-040 S1 (HW wallet DIFERIDO a pre-prod); SEC-004 §13 P0 residual risk"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0012",
      "date": "2023-12-31",
      "protocol": "Orbit Bridge",
      "chain": "Ethereum/Klaytn",
      "attackVector": "Multisig compromise (7-of-10) + firewall disabled por ex-empleado",
      "amountLostUsd": "81500000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "Ex-CISO cambió firewall policies 2d antes de retirement voluntario",
      "reference": "Halborn explainer, Rekt",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "unknown",
      "aspeRelevance": "Medium",
      "aspeGap": "Sole-operator reduce structurally. Phase 2 multi-admin: offboarding checklist obligatorio con revocation audit",
      "aspeMitigation": "Diseño actual sole-operator; Phase 2+ LEGAL-004 con procedure"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0013",
      "date": "2022-08-09",
      "protocol": "Nomad Bridge",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Upgrade inicializó trusted roots = 0x00 → cualquier mensaje valid",
      "amountLostUsd": "190000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "38000000",
      "timeWindow": "~6h",
      "rootCause": "Zero-hash matchea untrusted root en verificación; initializer bug post-upgrade (copycats entraron en 4h)",
      "reference": "Immunefi hack analysis",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "**High**",
      "aspeGap": "UUPS + initializer exactly esta área",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-010 _disableInitializers() en constructor; SEC-004 §9 attack surface \"upgrade\" documenta; ampliar invariante \"critical storage slots non-zero\" en S4"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0022",
      "date": "2024-08-06",
      "protocol": "Ronin (2nd)",
      "chain": "Ronin",
      "attackVector": "Upgrade initialization bug (dos initializers v3/v4, solo v4 called)",
      "amountLostUsd": "12000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "12000000",
      "timeWindow": "unknown",
      "rootCause": "_totalOperatorWeight=0 no seteado → cualquier signature valid",
      "reference": "Halborn",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "whitehat",
      "aspeRelevance": "**High**",
      "aspeGap": "Múltiples initializers en upgrade path",
      "aspeMitigation": "SEC-004 §8 Threat Model debe incluir \"post-upgrade state integrity\"; invariante runtime de critical storage != 0"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0014",
      "date": "2021-08-10",
      "protocol": "Poly Network",
      "chain": "Multi-chain",
      "attackVector": "Cross-contract access control misconfig",
      "amountLostUsd": "611000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "611000000",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "EthCrossChainManager podía llamar método privilegiado via crafted calldata",
      "reference": "Kudelski, SlowMist",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "whitehat",
      "aspeRelevance": "Medium",
      "aspeGap": "Bridge HyperCore via precompile 0x802 (write-only); no privileged cross-contract calls desde vault",
      "aspeMitigation": "Diseño actual evita superficie; cada función con onlyRole tests exhaustivos (IMPL-012 T3.1)"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0016",
      "date": "2021-12-01",
      "protocol": "BadgerDAO",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Cloudflare API compromise → JS injection → unlimited approval redirect",
      "amountLostUsd": "120000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "JS malicioso en frontend modificó approval recipient",
      "reference": "Halborn",
      "auditors": "Si (contratos)",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "**High**",
      "aspeGap": "Landing aspelabs.xyz en 1984 Hosting: DNS/hosting auth = attack surface directa",
      "aspeMitigation": "SEC-004 §10.7 DNS + RESEARCH-017 checklist; CSP headers + SRI en cualquier script externo; residual: CAA + DNSSEC verification (S5 T5.2 10.7)"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0017",
      "date": "2022-08-10",
      "protocol": "Curve Finance",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "DNS hijack via iwantmyname nameserver",
      "amountLostUsd": "570000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "Registrar comprometido a nivel de nameserver",
      "reference": "Curve substack",
      "auditors": "No",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "**High**",
      "aspeGap": "Mismo vector que Badger. 1984 Hosting: registry lock + DNSSEC + CAA",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-024 anonymous infra done; SEC-004 S5 §10.7 verifica estado actual"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0015",
      "date": "2022-09-20",
      "protocol": "Wintermute",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Profanity vanity address brute-force (CPRNG 32-bit seed)",
      "amountLostUsd": "162000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "Tool seedeaba con 32-bit → 1000 GPU × 50d crackea 7-char vanity",
      "reference": "Halborn, Amber Group",
      "auditors": "N/A (tool vuln)",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "Low",
      "aspeGap": "Admin addresses de ASPE generadas con hardware wallet (256-bit entropy standard)",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-023 wallet generation done; no vanity addresses"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0018",
      "date": "2023-07",
      "protocol": "Multichain",
      "chain": "Multi-chain",
      "attackVector": "MPC keys \"perdidos\" / likely inside control",
      "amountLostUsd": "126000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1d",
      "rootCause": "CEO arrested; withdrawals continuaron post-arrest",
      "reference": "Chainalysis",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "insider",
      "aspeRelevance": "Low",
      "aspeGap": "Sole-operator structural mitigation. Phase 2-3 multi-operator: m-of-n MPC + monitoring per-share",
      "aspeMitigation": "LEGAL-004 roadmap documenta; no blocker Fase 0"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0019",
      "date": "2023-12-14",
      "protocol": "Ledger Connect Kit",
      "chain": "NPM supply chain",
      "attackVector": "Ex-empleado phished → NPM session token stolen → versions 1.1.5-1.1.7 con Angel Drainer",
      "amountLostUsd": "600000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "NPM session token sin 2FA hardware",
      "reference": "Ledger incident report",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "**High**",
      "aspeGap": "Frontend vault Phase 2+: pin versions (lockfile), SRI, CSP, no latest tags; bot: requirements.lock + hash verification",
      "aspeMitigation": "S0c done (requirements.lock con sha256 hashes); SEC-004 §10.6 cubrirá frontend pipeline post-Phase 2"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0028",
      "date": "2021-11",
      "protocol": "bZx developer laptop",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Phishing email → Word macro → seed stolen desde dev machine",
      "amountLostUsd": "55000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "unknown",
      "rootCause": "Personal computer con seed en disco comprometido",
      "reference": "Halborn",
      "auditors": "-",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "**High**",
      "aspeGap": "Dev machine = admin machine es attack surface directa",
      "aspeMitigation": "SEC-003 draft §2 (admin machine hygiene); OPS-010 §15 IDE hygiene; HW wallet + no .env con keys (ya enforced)"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0027",
      "date": "2023-01-23",
      "protocol": "LastPass → Solana drainers",
      "chain": "-",
      "attackVector": "2022 LastPass breach exfiltró vaults con seed phrases → multi-protocolo drainer 6 meses después",
      "amountLostUsd": "null",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~6mo",
      "rootCause": "Seeds almacenados en password manager; LastPass pentest cred storage comprometida",
      "reference": "Múltiples Chainalysis/SlowMist",
      "auditors": "N/A",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "**High**",
      "aspeGap": "No almacenar seed phrases en KeePassXC ni en ningún password manager",
      "aspeMitigation": "OPS-010 §13 documenta: \"Backup paper only para HW wallet seeds, nunca en KeePassXC\""
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0021",
      "date": "2022-02-02",
      "protocol": "Wormhole",
      "chain": "Solana↔Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Signature verification bypass (sysvar account confusion)",
      "amountLostUsd": "326000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "326000000",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "load_instruction_at no verificaba sysvar real → fake account bypass",
      "reference": "Halborn, Kudelski",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "Low",
      "aspeGap": "Vault no verifica signatures cross-chain (precompile oficial HL)",
      "aspeMitigation": "Trust en CoreWriter precompile documented en PROD-002"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0020",
      "date": "2020-11-26",
      "protocol": "Compound DAI",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Coinbase oracle deviation $1 → $1.30 + Uniswap sanity falló",
      "amountLostUsd": "100000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "Single-source price feed sin multi-source fallback",
      "reference": "Decrypt",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "Low",
      "aspeGap": "Vault V1 sin oracle on-chain. Phase 2 assets con oracle: multi-source (Chainlink + Pyth + TWAP) + staleness + deviation breakers",
      "aspeMitigation": "Diseño actual N/A"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0009",
      "date": "2022-04-17",
      "protocol": "Beanstalk Farms",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Flash-loan governance attack",
      "amountLostUsd": "182000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "0",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "emergencyCommit() permitía execute en misma tx que vote",
      "reference": "Immunefi hack analysis",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "N/A",
      "aspeGap": "Phase 0: no DAO on-chain; no hay superficie. Phase 2+: snapshot-at-block + voting period > flash loan duration",
      "aspeMitigation": "STRAT-004 roadmap (Phase 2) documenta requisito"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0023",
      "date": "2023-04-09",
      "protocol": "Sushi RouteProcessor2",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "Approval bug: user approval al router → router llama arbitrary pool → malicious pool drena",
      "amountLostUsd": "3300000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "2600000",
      "timeWindow": "~1h",
      "rootCause": "call() con params controlled-by-user hacia contratos arbitrarios",
      "reference": "Sushi post-mortem",
      "auditors": "Si",
      "attribution": "crime-unattributed",
      "aspeRelevance": "Medium",
      "aspeGap": "Router actual (AspeLabsRouter) no hace external calls con addresses controlled-by-caller",
      "aspeMitigation": "IMPL-012 T3.9 RT1-RT4 PASS; forceApprove + revert deshace aprobación"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0024",
      "date": "2022-05-09",
      "protocol": "Terra UST/Luna",
      "chain": "Terra",
      "attackVector": "Algorithmic stablecoin death spiral",
      "amountLostUsd": "50000000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "null",
      "timeWindow": "~1d",
      "rootCause": "Peg backed solo por LUNA mint + Anchor 19.5% yield insostenible → bank run",
      "reference": "MIT Sloan",
      "auditors": "N/A",
      "attribution": "unknown",
      "aspeRelevance": "N/A",
      "aspeGap": "Vault no es stablecoin; yield real (trading P&L, no subsidio)",
      "aspeMitigation": "STRAT-001 documenta yield source"
    },
    {
      "id": "HACK-0031",
      "date": "2026-04-18",
      "protocol": "KelpDAO",
      "chain": "Ethereum",
      "attackVector": "OFT drain via LayerZero DVN 1/1 config: Lazarus sustituyo binarios de 2 nodos RPC + DDoS a nodos legitimos → verificador LayerZero Labs recibio mensajes manipulados",
      "amountLostUsd": "292000000",
      "amountRecoveredUsd": "null",
      "timeWindow": "<5min",
      "rootCause": "Configuracion DVN 1/1 (un solo validador obligatorio, sin optional DVNs) contra recomendacion publica LayerZero. Bug no fue en codigo LZ/Kelp sino en decision de config. OApps multi-DVN fueron inmunes (contagio = 0)",
      "reference": "RESEARCH-026, LayerZero attribution",
      "auditors": "Si (Kelp auditado; LayerZero code no fue el bug)",
      "attribution": "DPRK-Lazarus",
      "aspeRelevance": "Low",
      "aspeGap": "Vault Phase 0-1 usa precompile oficial HL-CoreWriter, no OFT ni bridges custom; Phase 2 cross-chain (PROD-001 §2.9) y potencial OFT de token ASPE requieren stance multi-DVN ≥3/N",
      "aspeMitigation": "RESEARCH-026 approved; stance: (a) vault core bridge-agnostic, (b) si OFT → CCIP primario + LZ 3/N fallback, (c) pattern D2 Finance \"OFT-compatible pero unwired\""
    }
  ]
}